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Abstract - Behavioral flexibility in how one responds to variable partner play can be examined using economic 
coordination games in which subjects play against a variety of partners and therefore may need to alter their 
behavior to produce the highest payoff. But how do we study this behavioral flexibility once players have settled on 
a response? Here, we investigated how responding by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo 
sapiens) playing a computerized single-player version of a coordination game, the Assurance game, changed as a 
function of the variable responses (Stag/Hare) generated by multiple simulations (SIMs). We were interested in 
whether individuals could track and differentially respond to changing frequencies of Stag and Hare play by the 
SIMs, especially with regard to the payoff dominant (Stag-Stag) outcome, something that could not be done with 
real partners as they quickly settled on the Stag response. For both monkeys and humans, there was a linear 
relationship between proportion of Stag play by the subject and the likelihood of the Stag choice by the SIM such 
that both species increased their use of Stag as the SIM increased its use of the Stag response. However, humans 
more closely matched their proportion of Stag responses to that of the SIM, whereas monkeys adopted a different, 
but equally effective, strategy of exploiting the higher-paying Stag alternative. These results suggest that monkeys 
and humans demonstrate sensitivity to a dynamic game environment in which they encounter variable contingencies 
for the same response options, although they may employ different strategies to maximize reward. 
 
Keywords - Assurance game; Economic decision-making; Rhesus monkeys, Macaca mulatta, Humans, Homo 
sapiens 
 
 
 Social animals must make frequent decisions about whether to interact with conspecifics and, if 
they do interact, how to do so. In some cases working together may provide benefits above and beyond 
those that can be obtained individually (e.g., cooperation: Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Kappeler & van 
Schaik, 2005). However, working together is not always the best option, even in situations in which the 
potential payoffs seem to suggest that it is. In some cases, partners may defect (e.g., cheat), either failing 
to reciprocate or, more subtly, they may return less than they receive, avoid situations with greater 
potential costs, or avoid future interactions, all of which can negate the advantages to a player who has 
chosen to attempt to work with such a partner (Dugatkin, 1997). Thus, in many situations, changing 
partnerships or contexts may mean that the most profitable strategy requires individuals to deploy 
different behaviors with different social partners.  
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What is key, then, is flexibility; ideally individuals should be able to change their strategy 
depending upon their partner‘s pattern of play. This can be examined using game-theoretic coordination 
games in which subjects play against a variety of partners or in different situations and therefore might 
need to flexibly alter their behavior to achieve the outcome with the highest payoff. Adapting to changing 
contingencies for one‘s response options can help us understand how one might then adapt to changing 
play by one‘s partner or opponent, or to different patterns of response due to environmental changes. In 
the present study, we utilized this logic to explore flexibility of responses in an economic game. We 
investigated how rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens) responded to variable 
patterns of play produced by simulations (hereafter SIMs) that each employed a different response pattern 
in the Assurance game, a coordination game.  
A normal form game in economics has three elements: the set of players, the set of actions or 
strategies (played simultaneously), and payoff functions that map the actions of players into payoffs. The 
Assurance game is a two-player, two-strategy normal form game. A pair of actions, one for each player, is 
called a Nash equilibrium if both actions are a payoff-maximizing response to the other. There are two 
Nash equilibria in the Assurance game, one of which is payoff-dominant, meaning that no other Nash 
equilibrium yields a higher payoff. The second Nash equilibrium is risk-dominant, meaning that there is 
less risk (or, as in this case, no risk) to a player if the other player deviates from the Nash equilibrium. 
The oft-studied Prisoner‘s Dilemma game differs from the Assurance game in that its payoff functions 
result in one Nash equilibrium that is (payoff) dominated by a non-equilibrium outcome with higher 
payoffs for both players.  
 Nonhuman primates (hereafter primates) make an interesting comparison group for understanding 
the evolution of choice behavior in social contexts because they typically comprise large and flexible 
social groups in which there are many opportunities for both affiliative and aggressive behaviors (Smuts, 
Cheney, Seyfarth, Wrangham, & Struhsaker, 1987). Humans and other primates also share aspects of 
several of the same decision-making characteristics, including negative responses to inequity (Brosnan & 
de Waal, 2003), loss aversion (Chen, Lakshminarayanan, & Santos, 2006), and an endowment effect 
(Brosnan et al., 2007; Lakshminarayanan, Chen, & Santos, 2008). Moreover, evidence indicates that 
primates are flexible in their social decision-making, and in particular are sensitive to their partners‘ 
identity and behavior in cooperative contexts. For example, chimpanzees prefer tolerant over non-tolerant 
partners in a cooperative task (Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006). Capuchin monkeys (Cebus) prefer to 
cooperate and share rewards with kin (de Waal, 1997), with those conspecifics that have previously 
reciprocated in a cooperative act (de Waal & Berger, 2000; de Waal & Davis, 2003), and with those who 
do not monopolize access to a better reward (Brosnan, Freeman, & de Waal, 2006). There is also 
evidence that rhesus monkeys are sensitive to partner identity and rank among their own social groups 
(e.g., Gouzoules, Gouzoules, & Marler, 1984). Given these findings and others, primates should be 
sensitive to different types of partners, flexibly altering their behavior in order to maximize their own 
payoffs. Sensitivity to changes in a partner‘s behavior or to different response patterns among various 
partners increases the potential for maximizing one‘s payoffs because one can decrease time spent (and 
wasted) with partners that are likely to defect or in situations in which payoffs are not maximized by 
cooperating. Nonhuman primates, therefore, can provide important insights into human economic 
decision-making by participating in dynamic game situations that are similar to those that typically are 
used with humans (c.f. Kalenscher & Van Wingerden, 2011). 
We previously investigated performance in the Assurance game among four primate species: 
humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and tufted 
capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella; Brosnan et al., 2011, 2012). Also known as the Stag Hunt game, the 
Assurance game often is used to model social interactions in the form of a simple 2x2 normal-form game 
of mutual coordination in which payoffs are contingent upon two players‘ responses such that they must 
coordinate their decisions to maximize rewards (Skyrms, 2003). Each individual chooses between a Stag 
or Hare response. Coordinating on Stag results in the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium as it yields the 
maximum possible payoff for each individual; following this, any outcome other than Stag-Stag results in 
a lower payoff for both players. Coordinating on Hare results in the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium as it 
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avoids a zero-payoff; however, it results in a lower payoff for both individuals than if they had 
coordinated on Stag. In a mixed Stag-Hare outcome, playing Stag results in nothing while playing Hare 
results in the lower payoff. Thus, there is an incentive to coordinate actions on either response, and 
especially on Stag. This game also provides a relatively species-fair approach to examining the evolution 
of decision-making across the primates because one can hold methodologies (e.g., instructions, 
experience, and payoff delivery) as consistent as possible across all species tested to provide an 
equivalent experimental approach. 
In the initial study with humans, chimpanzees, and capuchin monkeys, we found that humans 
outperformed both nonhuman primate species in that a higher percentage of pairs coordinated on Stag 
(humans: 5/26 exclusive pairs; chimpanzees: 2/14 non-exclusive pairs; capuchins: 1/6 non-exclusive pairs, 
Brosnan et al., 2011). Thus at least some individuals from all species achieved this outcome, suggesting 
continuity in decision-making outcomes in this coordination game, as well as individual differences in 
decision-making in all species tested. In this first experiment, it was possible for subjects to see each 
other‘s choices prior to making their decision. Thus, it was possible that decisions for all species were 
improved by the availability of exogenous cues (i.e., information about the partner‘s choice) before a 
player had to make his or her own choice. The simplest way for this to occur was through subjects 
matching the response of the partner. To test this further, we utilized a computerized version of the task in 
which we compared outcomes in a condition in which choices were revealed as they were made to a 
condition in which choices were hidden until both partners had selected an option. Rhesus monkeys‘ 
outcomes were more similar to humans‘ than either of these species‘ outcomes were to capuchin 
monkeys‘, with both humans and rhesus monkeys readily achieving the payoff dominant outcome in the 
absence of exogenous cues whereas capuchin monkeys failed to do so without these cues (Brosnan et al., 
2012). Thus, humans and rhesus monkeys apparently did not use a simple strategy such as matching a 
partner‘s response, although we were unable to determine how these species might respond to variable 
partner play, because neither species varied their response strategies in this version of the game.  
Although economic games are typically played in a social environment, we know that animals 
can track and rapidly respond to shifting rates of reinforcement in their environments outside of a social 
context (e.g., Davison & Baum, 2000; Gallistel, Mark, King, Latham, 2001; Herrnstein, 1958; Kacelnik, 
Krebs, & Ens, 1987; Mark & Gallistel, 1994). In addition, many species show evidence indicative of 
probability matching, in which animals demonstrate a tight correspondence between the distribution of 
their responses among concurrent choices and the reinforcement rates for the given choice alternatives 
(e.g., Columbidae: Bullock & Bitterman, 1962; Herrnstein, 1961; Tilapia macrocephala: Behrend & 
Bitterman 1961; Bos taurus: Matthews & Temple, 1979; Macaca mulatta: Lau & Glimcher, 2005; 
Wilson, Oscar, Bitterman 1964). However, this ability to probability match may vary in tests that are 
designed as multi-player competitive games using computer-simulated opponents. For example, in earlier 
work, rhesus monkeys‘ selections among choice options were not in line with probability matching but 
instead were influenced by the choice history of the two ‗players‘ involved (Lee, Conroy, McGreevy, & 
Barraclough, 2004). One of the goals for the current study was to link these two bodies of research (e.g., 
reinforcement learning and decision-making), as they are relevant to our continuing interest in cross-
species performance in strategic economic games.  
As stated earlier, our previous research demonstrated that rhesus monkeys could achieve the 
payoff-dominant outcome at a level comparable to human adults (Brosnan et al., 2012), but we know little 
about how comparably these two species would respond to varying strategies in the same environment. In 
the previous study, once the monkeys (and humans) learned that a high level of reward accompanied Stag 
play, they rarely, if ever, chose the Hare response. Thus, there was no opportunity to determine whether 
the monkeys (or humans) could flexibly adapt to a changing pattern of response by their partners. To 
address this, we designed a set of simulations (SIMs) for the current study that were programmed to 
employ a variable set of response patterns that were operationally defined as probabilities of playing the 
Stag response. This was an explicitly nonsocial version of the Assurance game in which we explored the 
relation between monkeys‘ and humans‘ patterns of choice behavior in response to different 
reinforcement contingencies of simulated probabilistic responders. Subjects of both species were tested 
218 Parrish et al. 
Animal Behavior and Cognition 2014, 1(3):215-229 
alone, but in a situation in which they had previously been tested with a partner, to emphasize that they 
were not playing a conspecific. We anticipated that the monkeys (and humans) would easily solve the 
task without the presence of a partner. Additional studies will be needed to determine the degree to which 
the presence of a partner may influence subjects‘ original pattern of play, as our study was not designed to 
address this question. 
We had two hypotheses. First, we expected that rhesus monkeys and humans would engage in 
differential play against each of the different SIMs, based on the monkeys‘ and humans‘ previous 
proficiency on this task when paired with conspecifics (Brosnan et al., 2012). Second, we predicted that 
this differential play against the varying SIMs would serve to allow both species to obtain more rewards 
than would occur with random responding, or rigid use of only one response choice (e.g., consistently 
playing only Stag or only Hare). We suspected that the monkeys would be somewhat more biased toward 
the Stag response than humans given these monkeys‘ prior history of predominantly choosing Stag when 
playing this task with real monkeys, although we also controlled for this to the degree possible by giving 
humans experience in playing with a real partner that was comparable to humans‘ experience in Brosnan 
et al. (2012) before engaging with the SIMs.  
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
 
Eight adult male rhesus monkeys were tested. All monkeys were housed at the Language 
Research Center of Georgia State University. They were moved during the testing session to a specially 
designed paired testing area used in the previous Assurance Game study and were returned to their normal 
home rooms after each testing session (Brosnan et al., 2012). Unlike in Brosnan et al. (2012) where 
monkeys were tested directly next to each other, and shared a computer screen on which they worked, 
monkeys in this experiment were tested individually and were housed alone in the ―paired testing‖ room 
during testing. This was done to emphasize that they were playing alone in the current study, in contrast 
to the procedure in the previous study. In the current test, they ―shared‖ the computer screen with the SIM, 
but, as in the previous study, they controlled their own choices on their half of the screen. They were 
given their normal daily diet of fruits, vegetables, and primate chow each day, regardless of the amount of 
work they completed during test sessions, and so they were not food-deprived or water-deprived for 
testing.  
 Thirty undergraduate students were recruited from the student body at Chapman University, 
Orange, CA, USA via email. Subjects were paid $7 for showing up on time, plus their experimental 
earnings. Criterion for inclusion was involvement in at least one economic experiment prior to the current 
study as to facilitate understanding of the testing setup and payment delivery system (note that subjects 
were never deceived and could always keep their earnings in studies at the economics lab). Involvement 
in any previous normal-form games, including the Assurance game, disqualified subjects. Accordingly, 
subjects had not participated in our earlier work (Brosnan et al., 2012). As with the monkeys, we wished 
to emphasize that they were not playing another partner in the current game, but without telling them this 
because the monkeys could not be told.  Therefore we initially tested them as a pair, then moved them 
down the hall to a similar set-up, but one in which they were alone in the room (see Human Procedure,  
below, for additional details on the humans‘ procedure). 
 
Apparatus 
 
 The monkeys were tested using the Language Research Center‘s Computerized Test System—
(LRC-CTS; described in Rumbaugh, Richardson, Washburn, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Hopkins, 1989; 
Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1992). This consisted of a personal computer, digital joystick, a 17 in. LCD 
color monitor, and a pellet dispenser. Monkeys viewed the monitor from a distance of approximately 30 
to 60 cm, depending on each monkey‘s own preference for where in the test cage it sat as it worked. 
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Monkeys previously had learned to manipulate the joystick to produce isomorphic movements of a 
computer-graphic cursor on the screen. Contacting appropriate stimuli using this apparatus cursor brought 
them 94-mg fruit-flavored chow pellets delivered by a dispenser interfaced to the computer through a 
digital I/O board.  
Human subjects were tested using a similar setup as the monkeys. The testing setup included a 
personal computer, a computer mouse (for testing), joystick (for pre-testing), and a 22 in. LCD color 
monitor. Participants were seated in front of a computer in individual study carrels and were alone in the 
laboratory to emphasize that they were not playing with a real person. Contacting appropriate stimuli 
brought them nickels. These nickels were not immediately distributed, but the monetary reward amount 
for each choice was displayed above the selected stimulus and added to the total also displayed on the 
screen. The final total was distributed to the subjects in full at the conclusion of the study.  
The task. On every trial, each individual chose between the Stag and Hare response. Playing 
Stag led to either four units of a reward if the SIM also played Stag (Stag-Stag), but led to a zero-payoff if 
the SIM played Hare (Stag-Hare). Playing Hare always led to one unit of a reward, regardless of whether 
the SIM played Hare (Hare-Hare) or Stag (Hare-Stag).  
We introduced six different SIMs. These SIMs varied in their choice of the Stag response. Five of 
those SIMs chose the Stag response with a probability of 0.0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, or 1.00 on each trial. The 
final SIM played a tit-for-tat (TfT) strategy, choosing whatever response the monkey or human had made 
on the previous trial, with the SIM randomly choosing the Stag or Hare response on the first trial of a 
block when that strategy was employed. Hereafter, these SIMs will be referred to as the 0.0, 0.25, 0.50, 
0.75, 1.0, or TfT SIM to indicate their proportion of Stag play.  
Design and procedure. The experimental task was presented on a computer monitor (Figure 1). 
Two icons appeared on each side of a split computer screen, one at the top and one at the bottom of the 
screen (randomized across trials, such that sometimes icons were in the same arrangement for both sides 
and sometimes they were not), and a cursor was centered between each of the icons. One of the icons 
represented Stag (a red square) and one represented Hare (a blue circle). These were the same stimuli 
used in Brosnan et al. (2012). Subjects always used the left side of the screen and the SIMs‘ choices were 
always depicted on the right side of the screen. Subjects made a choice by deflecting a joystick either 
upward or downward with their hand to select one of the two icons, or clicked one of those icons with the 
mouse, following which both icons on that side of the screen disappeared. The SIM also made its 
selection of one of the two icons (based on its pre-set play strategy; see above) one second after the 
stimuli appeared, and then both icons on its side of the screen disappeared. Once the subject and the SIM 
had both made a response, the selected icons from both sides of the screen simultaneously re-appeared in 
the center on the relevant side of the monitor. Thus, subjects could not know which icon the SIM selected 
before making their own response, and therefore could not match the SIM‘s play on a given trial. Both 
selected icons remained visible for 3 s, during which time the rewards (food pellets for monkeys; money 
for humans) were allocated, and then the screen went blank for 5 s before the next trial was presented.  
 Non-human primate procedure. Each experimental block within a session consisted of 60 trials 
in which the SIM played according to one of its six predetermined strategies. Following this was a 20 min 
inter-block interval during which the screen was blank. At the end of that interval, a new 60-trial block 
was presented, with a new SIM strategy implemented. This 20 min delay was a very significant event for 
these monkeys, and functioned as a signal that a major change had just occurred. These monkeys typically 
have continuous access to the computer system, and they play different computerized games throughout 
the day to provide data for different research teams. Changes in the nature of the tasks in which they are 
engaging often are signaled by the completion of one task during one test session and a delay before the 
next task is presented. During this time, the screen is either blank or returns to the desktop, and there is no 
way the monkey can interact with the screen. We made use of the monkeys‘ extensive experience with 
this situation, and this 20 min inter-block delay functioned much like completion of a task in other 
circumstances. We did not more overtly cue the monkey about the potential change in how the SIM 
would operate in a new block (e.g., by changing the background color) because this would have been a 
discriminative cue that was not available in Brosnan et al. (2012). The six SIM strategies were exhausted 
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within each 6-block run of the program in a daily session, with strategy order within those blocks 
randomly determined. Monkeys worked on the task for between 4 and 6 hr, once per day, and usually 
once per week, completing as many blocks as possible given their motivation to engage the task.  
  When monkeys ended testing one day and began on another day, a new randomized SIM order 
was established for that session. Monkeys continued to be tested until they had completed five blocks 
against each of the six possible SIMs, and for each SIM only the first five blocks against that SIM were 
included in the analyses. Although blocks were set at 60 trials, sometimes a test session ended in the 
middle of a block, but these data still were counted in the analyses and included as one of the five blocks 
against that particular SIM. Because of a computer malfunction, two sessions against the 0.0 probability 
SIM were lost for one monkey (Chewie), and so only three sessions against that SIM were included in the 
analyses.  
Time	
Course	
A
C
B
D
 
  
Figure 1. Outline of one possible trial. A) Initially, both sides of the screen present the Stag (rectangle) or Hare (Circle) stimuli, 
with random presentation of one or the other at top of screen. B) The player can choose at anytime, and here the player would 
choose first, at which point that side of the screen (left) goes blank. C) The SIM makes its response 1 second after the choice 
stimuli appear, and then its side of the screen (right) goes blank. D) Both selections then are shown at center of the screen and the 
player is rewarded (or not) depending on the contingency in place for that particular outcome (here, it is Stag-Stag). 
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 Human procedure. Humans were given a procedure that was analogous to that of the rhesus 
monkeys‘ procedure to the degree possible. Because the monkeys all had previous experience finding the 
Stag outcome, it was critical that the humans also have previous paired experience with the game.  Thus, 
prior to engaging the SIM procedure described above, each pair of humans completed a pre-testing 
session in which they worked for coins that were deposited from a coin dispenser (analogous to the 
primates‘ pellet dispenser) in the same 4:1 ratios using the same procedures as in Brosnan et al. (2012). 
Humans kept all of the money that they made from the testing session (including both the paired and the 
SIM procedures), as well as their $7 payment for showing up on time.  
As with our earlier studies, we limited the humans‘ instruction on the task to the bare minimum in 
order to more closely mimic the experience of the monkeys, who had to figure out the contingencies of 
the task from interacting with it. Our previous work demonstrated that this worked well with humans and 
provided valuable results for comparison. The humans‘ only instruction was limited to the following 
points asked prior to participation: 
 
 Have you participated in an economic experiment before? (Players had to reply with a ‗yes‘ to 
participate.) 
 In this experiment, you will be making decisions using a joystick attached to a computer.  
 As the experiment progresses, you may be paid in dimes by the machines next to your computer.  
 Please collect the coins in the cups provided so as to not clog up the machines.  
 These are the only instructions you will receive in the experiment. Once the experiment begins, 
the experimenter will not be allowed to answer any questions until the experiment is over.  
 Do you have any questions before the experiment begins?  
 
Phase 1: Pre-Test Experience with Human Partner. Human participants first played a 40-trial 
experimental block with a human partner. This experience playing with a human partner was necessary to 
provide some degree of real-partner experience comparable to that of the rhesus monkeys that had 
experience playing the Assurance game with a monkey partner in earlier studies (Brosnan et al., 2012). 
Because of computer malfunction, one pair of humans completed 39 trials instead of 40 trials. 
Partners were seated next to one another at a single computer and each had access to their own 
digital joystick. Contacting appropriate stimuli brought them coins delivered by a coin dispenser. The 
computerized procedure was identical to the monkey task; however, the first two trials of this paired-
session involved familiarizing the humans with making responses and controlling the cursor on their 
respective sides of the screen. In these first trials, humans were required to twice move the cursor to a 
large green rectangle, on the first trial with no time constraint and on the second trial within 15 seconds 
(once at the top and once at the bottom of the screen before the actual test started). Monkeys did not do 
this because they already were experienced with this task from Brosnan et al. (2012). 
Phase 2: Human versus SIM Testing. Next, participants moved to individual test stations to 
complete their blocks against the different SIMs. This physical re-location was important to emphasize to 
the humans that they were no longer playing with a human partner, a feature that was emphasized to the 
monkeys by moving them to their ―paired testing‖ location but then testing them without a partner and 
without any other monkey in the same room with them. Now, participants used a mouse to select stimuli 
rather than a joystick.  
Each experimental block consisted of 40 trials in which the SIM played according to one of its six 
predetermined strategies. Fewer trials were used so that humans would have time to complete playing 
against each SIM within one testing session, and to match the number of trials humans received in each 
session in Brosnan et al., 2012. After this first block, a 30-second inter-block interval occurred during 
which the screen was blank. At the end of that interval, a new 40-trial block was presented, with a new 
SIM strategy implemented. The SIM order within those blocks was randomly determined without 
replacement until all six SIM strategies were exhausted. No human participated in more than one human-
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pairing or played more than once against each SIM. Participants could cash in all experimental earnings 
for larger bills at the conclusion of the study. When playing the SIMs, one unit of reward was 5 cents.  
 
Results 
 
The current human participants performed similarly to the humans from Brosnan et al. (2012) 
when they were seated next to and played with a real human partner. In that study, 81.48% (22 of 27) 
pairs ultimately achieved the payoff-dominant Stag-Stag outcome, meaning that both players selected the 
Stag response in at least 7 of the last 10 trials. In the current study, 66.67% (10 of 15) pairs ultimately 
achieved this payoff-dominant outcome. This frequency of pairs achieving the Stag-Stag outcome did not 
differ significantly across the two studies, Χ
2 
(1, N = 42) = 1.17, p = 0.28.  
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the overall selection patterns of each species for each of the 
SIMs that were presented. This figure includes all trials against each SIM in the calculation of the mean 
choice percentages for Stag. However, our assumption was that performance early in the block likely 
differed from performance late in the block as subjects learned more about the outcomes of their Stag and 
Hare play against each of the SIMs. For each probabilistic SIM, these data were therefore divided into the 
first 20 trials versus the last 20 trials in the 60-trial block for monkeys or the first 15 trials versus the last 
15 trials in the 40-trial block for humans. The resulting data are presented in Figure 3. We used a mixed 
model ANOVA to determine the potential impact of SIM type, species, and trial block on choice behavior 
measured as selection of the Stag response. We excluded the TfT SIM from these analyses as it was 
qualitatively different from the linear progression of the remaining SIMs (however, we included this SIM 
in Figure 2 for a visual depiction of performance). Trial block was included as a factor so that we could 
examine performance as a function of early and late trials within blocks, as defined above.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean percentage of trials on which the monkeys (light gray bars) and humans (dark gray bars) selected the Stag 
response as a function of the SIM strategy with which they were playing. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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A) 
 
B) 
 
Figure 3. A) Mean percentage of trials on which the monkeys selected the Stag response in the first 20 trials (gray line) versus 
the last 20 trials (black line) within a 60-trial block. B) Mean percentage of trials on which the humans selected the Stag response 
in the first 15 trials (gray line) versus the last 15 trials (black line) within a 40-trial block. 
 
 There was a main effect of SIM, F(4, 144) = 29.50, p < 0.001, η
2 
= 0.45, and species, F(1, 36) = 
9.50, p = 0.004, η
2 
= 0.21, but not of block, F(1, 144) = 2.77, p = 0.11, η
2 
= 0.07. The two way interaction 
of SIM and species was significant, F(4, 144) = 12.70, p < 0.001, η
2 
= 0.26, indicating that the effect of 
SIM on strategy differed between monkeys and humans. The two way interaction of SIM and block was 
significant, F(4, 144) = 10.80, p < 0.001, η
2 
= 0.23, indicating that performance differed as a function of 
experience against the SIMs. There was not an interaction of species and block, F(1, 144) = 0.0, p = 0.99, 
η
2 
= 0.00.  There was no three-way interaction, F(4, 36) = 0.98, p = 0.42, η
2 
= 0.027.  
We then conducted a repeated measures ANOVA for each species to examine the effect of block 
and SIM. For the monkeys, there was a main effect of SIM, F(4, 28) = 4.50, p = 0.006, η
2 
= 0.39, but not 
block, F(1, 28) = 4.70, p = 0.07, η
2 
= 0.40. However, the two way interaction of SIM and block was 
significant, F(4, 28) = 6.55, p = 0.001, η
2 
= 0.48, indicating that choice behavior differed across SIMs but 
also varied as a function of block within some SIMs. For the humans, there was also a main effect of SIM, 
F(4, 116) = 81.43, p < 0.001, η
2 
= 0.74, but not block, F(1, 116) = 2.77, p = 0.11, η
2 
= 0.09. Again, the 
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two way interaction of SIM and block was significant, F(4, 116) = 13.63, p < 0.001, η
2 
= 0.32, indicating 
the same potential change in choice behavior for early or late blocks against different SIMs.  
Because of these two-way interactions for both species, we next examined the simple main 
effects to determine where differences in choice behavior occurred for each SIM and for each block. For 
monkeys, Stag play decreased from the early to late block for the 0.0 SIM: t(7) = 2.83, p = 0.025 and for 
the 0.25 SIM: t(7) = 2.76, p = 0.028. However, Stag play increased from the early block to the late block 
for the 0.75 SIM: t(7) = -3.64, p = 0.008. Choice behavior did not differ from the early to late block for 
the 0.50 SIM: t(7) = -1.36, p = 0.22 or for the 1.0 SIM: t(7) = -1.74, p = 0.13. For humans, Stag play 
decreased from the early to late block for the 0.0 SIM: t(29) = 6.24, p < 0.001 and the 0.25 SIM: t(29) = 
2.33, p = 0.027, but Stag play increased from the early to the late block for the 0.75 SIM: t(29) = -3.07, p 
= 0.005 and the 1.0 SIM: t(29) = -2.67, p = 0.01. Stag play did not differ from early to late block for the 
0.50 SIM: t(29) = 1.31, p = 0.20.  
A visual examination of the proportion of Stag play for monkeys and humans for the last block of 
trials across the various SIMs indicated that humans more closely approximated the probabilities of Stag 
responding by the SIMs than did the monkeys. Correlational analyses confirmed this. The correlation 
of the proportion of Stag play by humans compared to the SIM probabilities of Stag play was statistically 
significant, r(3) = 0.991, p = 0.001, while for the monkeys it was not, r(3) = 0.853, p = 0.07. The 
proportion of Stag play in the SIM accounted for 98% of the variance in the human proportions of Stag 
play, whereas for monkeys it accounted for only 73% of the variance. Thus, although both species varied 
their proportion of Stag play in line with that of the SIMs by the end of trial blocks, humans came much 
closer to matching the probabilities of Stag responding by the SIMs. 
Finally, we examined overall efficiency in playing the Assurance game by calculating the mean 
number of rewards (pellets for monkeys and nickels for humans) earned per trial for each SIM. This 
measure provided a means of assessing whether either of the two patterns, that seen in monkeys (a strong 
early bias towards Stag play with only moderate shifts to greater Hare play for some SIMs) or that seen in 
humans (an increasingly closer approximation of probability matching from early to late blocks), was 
more lucrative in generating reward. In fact, they were virtually identical in their reward outcomes. 
Across all SIMs (excluding TfT), human players averaged 1.98 nickels per trial and monkeys averaged 
1.91 pellets per trial. An independent samples t-test confirmed that this difference was not statistically 
significant, t(36) = 0.57, p = 0.57.  
Modeling. The payoff structure of the Assurance game impacts the degree to which Stag choice 
is the best response for a subject to play against a probabilistic SIM. To demonstrate this (it can also be 
established analytically), we modeled the performance of different hypothetical players that were faced 
with five of the SIMs that had been presented to the monkeys (0.0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.00 Stag-playing 
SIMs). We left out the TfT strategy as that SIM play varied depending upon the subject‘s choice. Each of 
these hypothetical players chose Stag with a different probability, ranging from 0.01 to 1.00, with a total 
of 100 players at each of the 100 probability levels. These hypothetical players completed 300 trials with 
each of the five SIMs, in the same way that the monkeys had. The model determined, on each trial, the 
likelihood of the player choosing Stag or Hare (against all possible probabilities of Stag play) and the 
likelihood of the SIM choosing Stag or Hare (based on its pre-set strategy) and then determined the 
contingencies (number of rewards earned) for that trial. These data are shown in Figure 4 as the average 
number of rewards obtained against each SIM by all 100 hypothetical players at each probability of Stag 
play on the part of the players.  
A few critical things emerge from this model that could explain the bias towards Stag play shown 
by the real monkeys. First, it is clear that, when the SIM played Stag with probability > 0.25 (i.e., the 0.50, 
0.75, and1.0 SIM), then the best response was to play Stag 100% of the time. If the SIM played Stag with 
probability < 0.25 (i.e., the 0.0 SIM), then the best response was to play Hare 100% of the time. When the 
SIM played Stag with a probability of 0.25 there was no best response for a player because the 4:1 payoff 
ratio meant that any probability level of selecting Stag (or Hare) would lead to the same expected number 
of pellets, as seen by the flat slope in Figure 4 for the 0.25 SIM. Thus, for five of the six SIMs pitted 
against the monkeys and humans, a rule such as ―play Stag every time‖ would have been the best 
Parrish et al. 225 
Animal Behavior and Cognition 2014, 1(3):215-229 
response (0.50, 0.75, 1.0, and TfT SIMs) or would not have been payoff dominated (against the 0.25 
SIM). Because a SIM with 0.0 probability of playing Stag occurred only one time in every six blocks of 
trials, there was actually little cost overall to playing Stag a high proportion of time across all SIMs. 
Although playing Hare 100% of the time would have resulted in the maximum possible payoff against 
the 0.0 SIM, this is still a relatively low payoff as it can only lead to one unit of reward. The real risk to 
the player is in not choosing Stag against the remaining SIMs that played Stag with probability > 0.25, 
because in all of those cases playing Hare in any proportion of trials greater than zero was worse than 
playing Stag exclusively.  
So if the preference for Stag was so effective, and more so than probability matching against 
some SIMs, how did the humans and rhesus monkeys end up with virtually identical earnings per trial?  
While a bias towards Stag play netted benefits in the 0.50 and 0.75 SIMs, players who probability 
matched would, on average, net the same number of rewards per trial because they would make up for the 
lost rewards against the 0.0 SIM, where they largely played the Hare response. Thus, the payoff matrix 
affords an equal advantage to a player who is biased to choose Stag against a changing partner (as the 
monkeys did) and a player who matches their partner‘s probability of choosing Stag (as the humans did).  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Results of modeling the reward outcomes for different play strategies against different SIMs. 100 hypothetical players 
each completed 300 trials at each of 100 probabilities of choosing Stag against each SIM that was used with the monkeys 
(excluding TfT). The mean number of pellets obtained by those 100 players is shown for each probability level for selecting Stag 
by those players.  
 
Discussion 
 
 In the present study, we investigated how responding by rhesus monkeys and humans in the 
Assurance game changed as a function of variable simulations of probabilistic play. We were interested in 
whether individual humans and monkeys could track and differentially respond to simulations that varied 
in the frequency with which they made the payoff-dominant response (i.e., Stag). For both rhesus 
monkeys and humans, there was a significant difference in the proportion of Stag play as a function of 
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which SIM was active. Specifically, there was a linear relationship between the proportion of Stag play by 
the subject and the likelihood of Stag play by the SIM so that monkeys and humans increased their use of 
the Stag response as the SIM increased its use of the Stag response. These results indicate that subjects of 
both species changed their behavior in response to the immediately prevailing reinforcement 
contingencies and did so in a way that better matched the payoff outcomes of the different SIMs as 
compared to just responding at chance or just using one response option (Stag or Hare). 
Although individuals of both species were apparently sensitive to the different probabilities of 
Stag responding by the SIMs, humans more closely aligned their proportion of Stag responses to that of 
the SIMs. Monkeys adopted a different, although equally effective, strategy of exploiting the higher-
paying Stag alternative. Interestingly, both species changed their responses within trial blocks as they 
learned more about the likelihood of Stag-play by each SIM so as to optimize their outcomes over the 
course of a block. Humans aligned their use of the Stag response in accordance with the SIMs early on, 
but came to even more closely match the SIMs‘ proportion of Stag use by the end of the block. Monkeys 
began each block of trials with a high-Stag bias (approximately 80%) and, as a function of experience 
with the reinforcement contingency of the active SIM, adjusted their use of the Stag response in 
accordance with the respective SIMs. We modeled these response patterns and found that both humans‘ 
and rhesus monkeys‘ strategies were equally efficient because there was little cost overall to the rhesus‘ 
strategy of playing Stag against all of the different SIMs. For four of six SIMs (1.0, 0.75, 0.50, and TfT 
SIM), the best strategy was 100% Stag play. For a fifth SIM (0.25 SIM), it made no difference, and it was 
only against the 0.0 SIM that playing Stag guaranteed a loss of potential rewards whereas 100% Hare 
play was the best response.  
The current findings are interesting in light of the literature on probability matching and optimal 
response strategies. When faced with repeated choices between two options that produce reward at 
different probabilities, humans often distribute their responses to each alternative in proportions that are 
roughly equivalent to the attendant payoff structure (see Baum, 1979; Vulcan, 2000, for reviews), and that 
is what the humans in the present study did. However, game theory predicts that individuals should 
allocate all of their responses to the higher-paying alternative, rather than distributing responses across 
the two choices (Edwards, 1961; Herrnstein & Loveland, 1975; Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy, 2002), 
which was closer to the pattern of behavior shown by our monkeys. In a different study in which rhesus 
monkeys played a competitive game against computerized simulations, the monkeys‘ selections were not 
in line with probability matching but instead were influenced by the choice history of the SIM (Lee et al., 
2004), much like the current set of results. Other studies have demonstrated this same effect, noting a 
difference in nonhuman animal versus human performance on related tests. For example, pigeons 
distributed a higher proportion of their responses to the higher-paying alternative than did humans in 
procedurally equivalent tasks (Goodie & Fantino, 1995, 1996; Hartl & Fantino, 1996). Some research 
teams have reported that nonhuman animals appear to respond in a way that better maximizes payoffs 
than humans to probabilistic game-like tasks such as the Monty Hall Dilemma (e.g., Herbranson & 
Schroeder, 2010), although this is not always the case (e.g., Klein, Evans, Schultz, & Beran, 2013; Mazur 
& Kahlbaugh, 2012).  
Here, the monkeys had previous experience with the Assurance game, from which they may have 
retained a preference for the Stag response (all monkeys achieved and maintained the payoff-dominant 
outcome of Stag-Stag in the earlier experiment; Brosnan et al., 2012). This prior experience with the 
reinforcement rate of the payoff structure coupled with the Stag response‘s high overall likelihood for 
payoff could have predisposed the monkeys to a Stag-biased response strategy in comparison to the more 
variable responding by humans, who did not have as much prior experience with the Assurance game as 
did the monkeys. However, we paired the current human participants with real partners to provide some 
level of experience equivalent to that received by humans in Brosnan et al. (2012) prior to beginning the 
SIM play. Another possibility is that monkeys may tend toward a more exclusive preference of one 
response option in discrete choice tasks, such as the Assurance game, than do humans (see Mazur, 2010), 
although they certainly varied that preference to a statistically significant degree across the different SIMs, 
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and they varied their use of the Stag response within blocks of trials against the different SIMs as they 
learned about the outcomes of their own responses. 
In past research examining human probability matching with dichotomous choice paradigms, 
adult humans gradually shifted away from probability matching and increased their proportion of choices 
of the option with the higher individual probability of reward as a function of experience on the task (e.g., 
Edwards, 1961; Fantino & Esfandiari, 2002; Goodie & Fantino, 1999). Thus, humans chose the more 
richly paying option as they performed the task longer, and so in our study, humans also might have 
increased their use of the richer Stag response against the SIMs in the current paradigm if they had been 
given more trials. Additional research in which humans are given the numbers of trials that these 
monkeys had would be necessary to determine whether humans might come to abandon probability 
matching and instead adopt the higher paying Stag-playing strategy. Such data would be helpful in further 
defining the similarities (and dissimilarities) between these species in their choice behavior.  
What remains to be seen in these kinds of tasks is the degree to which primates rely on and 
demonstrate the social behaviors (and cognitive processes) that are evident in other kinds of social tests 
versus relying solely on reinforcement contingencies when social partners are present. Whether primates 
are sensitive to the social context of games in which they are faced with more complex decision-making 
scenarios should be more fully investigated. Decision-making by social animals rarely occurs in a static, 
isolated environment, but instead takes place in a rapidly changing and highly variable setting in which 
one must be flexible in responding to fluctuating situations and individuals. The present results offer 
some preliminary insights into the nature of responding in the pursuit of optimizing one‘s own benefits in 
complex game environments. Future work building on these kinds of economic games can more fully 
vary the social context that would elicit differential response patterns (and even strategies) of nonhuman 
players.  
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